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LIFE INSURANCE AS ALIMONY - INCOME TAX ASPECTS
In certain separation and divorce cases, a husband may be bound
by agreement or decree to insure his life in order to guarantee his wife
a minimum amount of alimony.' This situation raises two tax prob-
lems. First, are the premium payments made by the husband for such
insurance considered alimony? Secondly, how should the proceeds
the wife receives be treated for tax purposes?
It is not settled in Louisiana2 whether, absent agreement between
the parties, the husband's obligation to pay alimony continues past
his death, and there is a conflict in other jurisdictions concerning this
issue. In most cases, the obligation has been incurred by the husband
through a negotiated divorce or separation agreement.' In other cases,
courts, pursuant to their statutory authority, have ordered that ali-
mony be paid over a specific period notwithstanding the death of the
husband." The obligation may be performed by using an existing
policy or by purchasing a new one; however, the federal income tax
question arises once premium payments are commenced pursuant to
the decree or agreement.
Premiums as Alimony
Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, alimony payments to
a separated or divorced wife are includible in her gross income and
1. See generally Nathan, Tax Aspects of Separation and Divorce, TUL. U. 20TH
TAX INST. 258 (1971).
2. Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that the wife is entitled to alimony when
inter alia "she has not sufficient means for her support .... " In Succession of King,
184 So. 2d 583 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966), the husband had stipulated that he would pay
to the wife $50 per week for the remainder of her life. The Fourth Circuit stated "[t]he
obligation to pay alimony stipulated by the deceased was merely the confirmation of
a duty imposed by law and governed by law as to its duration and future amount."
184 So. 2d at 584. (Emphasis added.) The court further noted that the stipulation only
fixed the alimony amount and that the stipulation that the alimony right and obliga-
tion was to be for life was immaterial because "[tihe law requires payment of alimony
to the wife ad infinitum as long as she is in necessitous circumstances .. " 184 So.
2d at 584. (Emphasis added.) While the language in King may imply that the obliga-
tion could continue past the death of the husband, it is dictum.
3. See generally H. CLARK, JR., LAW OF DoMESTIc RELATIONS § 14.9(5), at 461
(1968).
4. Thus, in these situations, the policy appears to function as a bargaining device.
For example, the wife may accept a smaller alimony payment in exchange for the
assurance that she will receive this amount.
5. Stevens v. Commissioner, 439 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1971); Kiesling v. United States,
349 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1965).
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are deductible from the gross income of the husband.' Alimony is
defined as periodic payments' received after a decree of divorce or
legal separation or the execution of a written separation agreement.,
Although the insurance premium payments are clearly periodic, the
courts have had difficulty in determining whether the wife has
received a payment from the husband when he pays the premium.
Earlier cases held that the husband's payment of premiums
would not be considered alimony if the policy was mere security
insuring that the wife would receive the entire amount stipulated in
the agreement or decree.' Later cases evolved a more positive judicial
test-if there had been an economic gain to the wife in actual or
constructive receipt of cash or property, the payment was alimony." '
It was also indicated that the wife was considered to have received
no benefit unless she had a non-contingent right to the proceeds-a
right to the proceeds which continues even though she may die or
remarry."
In Weil v. Commissioner" both the Tax Court and the Second
Circuit indicated that the wife's ownership of the policy was neces-
6. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 61, 71, 215.
7. Section 71(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that where a
principal sum is specified in the decree or agreement in terms of money or property,
such installment payment shall not be considered as periodic. See Treas. Reg. § 1.71-
1 (1957) for examples of periodic and installment payments.
8. Section 71(a) provides that the payments must be in discharge of a legal obliga-
tion imposed by the decree or written instrument incident to the divorce or separation
because of the marital or family obligation.
9. Blumenthal v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1950). The wife was irrevoca-
ble beneficiary and her husband was prohibited from encumbering the policies. The
husband retained ownership of the policies and the wife's interest in the policies ceased
upon her death or remarriage. She was permitted to obtain loans on the policy for
payment of overdue premiums. The court made no attempt to state what would qualify
the payments of premiums as alimony. Accord, William J. Gardner, 14 T.C. 1445
(1950), aff'd mem., 191 F.2d 857 (6th Cir. 1951).
10. Seligman v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1953); Mandel v. Commis-
sioner, 23 T.C. 81 (1954), aff'd, 229 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1956). The Seligman court stated
that realization of economic gain, as a prerequisite to its taxability, must be capable
of ascertainment in extent or amount. The court found that the taxpayer had received
no economic gain because there was no constructive receipt of cash and no property
right capable of measurement was received since any right she may have had was too
contingent. See also Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945); Helvering v. Horst,
311 U.S. 112 (1940); Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461 (1940) (dealing with the doctrine
of constructive receipt).
11. Seligman v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 489, 494 (7th Cir. 1953).
12. 22 T.C. 612 (1954), aff'd, 240 F.2d 584 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 958
(1957).
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sary to obtain alimony treatment,' and eight years later in Piel v.
Commissioner,'4 the Second Circuit stated:
It is apparent that the weight of recent authority has equated
benefits with ownership and has refused to allow a deduction
where the beneficiary has failed to obtain non-contingent sub-
stantial proprietary rights in the proceeds of the policies and thus
in the benefits generated by the premium payments.'"
Thus the search for an economic benefit seems to have culminated
in a determination that the wife derives economic benefit only from
the policy proceeds when there is substantial certainty that she will
receive the proceeds; that is, she must be both owner and irrevocable
beneficiary of the policy."
The recent Second Circuit case of Stevens v. Commissioner7
indicates a change in approach. In that case the wife was held to be
an irrevocable beneficiary despite the designation of the children as
contingent beneficiaries, and the husband received an alimony de-
duction equal to the cost of a reducing term policy premium. More
importantly, Stevens indicated that receipt of the proceeds was not
the only benefit accruing to the wife. The court stated that the wife
received an additional economic benefit in the "protection, during a
limited term, of the wife's right to receive alimony over the full ali-
mony period."'"
The Tax Court, however, in William H. Broderson, Jr.," declined
to follow Stevens and disallowed a deduction for premiums paid on
13. The Second Circuit stated: "She had no right to change the beneficiary, to
assign the policies, or to obtain the cash surrender values. Her interest ceased upon
her death or remarriage during his lifetime. While certain restrictions were placed upon
the husband's control of the policies, he clearly retained ownership." 240 F.2d at 587.
(Emphasis added.)
14. 340 F.2d 887 (2d Cir. 1965).
15. Id. at 890. (Emphasis added.) In Kiesling v. United States, 349 F.2d 110 (3d
Cir. 1965), the court noted that not only must the wife own the policy, but her interest
must not be contingent. Factors demonstrating the contingent nature of the wife's
interest included: cessation of her interest in the policy upon her death or remarriage;
revocability of her designation as beneficiary; the fact that the policy had not been
assigned to her and she had no right to assign or borrow on it.
16. See Rev. Rul. 218, 1970-1 CuM. BULL. 19. The Internal Revenue Service has
adopted the requirements that the wife be the owner and irrevocable beneficiary of the
policy for the payments to receive alimony treatment.
17. 439 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1971).
18. Id. at 72. (Emphasis added.) Although the policy in question was a whole life
policy, the court noted that a wife could receive an economic benefit from a term policy
because a term policy provided insurance protection for the year.
19. 57 T.C. 412 (1971).
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a reducing term policy, even though ownership was assigned to the
wife incident to a decree of divorce. In refusing to treat insurance
protection as an economic benefit, Stevens was distinguished on
three grounds: first, Stevens involved a whole life policy which con-
ferred additional benefits; secondly, the wife in Stevens had posses-
sion of the policies; and finally, the applicable language in Stevens
was "clearly dictum."2
The Stevens case appears to be more in accord with economic
reality because insurance protection as well as the proceeds consti-
tute recognized economic benefits. Moreover, the Internal Revenue
Service, in Paul L. Frost, 2 successfully asserted that insurance prem-
iums paid by the employer on the life of an employee2 1 constituted
compensation and were therefore to be included in the employee's
gross income. The court recognized that the cash surrender value of
the policies was an economic benefit received by the taxpayer, but
added:
In addition petitioner received each year in question basic insur-
ance protection. During the course of these years his family was
the beneficiary against his sudden disability or demise. This pro-
tection was of current economic value to him.13
Both compensation and alimony are specifically included in the defi-
nition of gross income.24 If insurance protection constitutes an eco-
nomic benefit for purposes of compensation, there seems to be no
basis for holding that insurance protection is not an economic benefit
for purposes of alimony. The traditionally broad application given
Section 61 by the courts should apply equally to compensation and
alimony, and thus insurance protection should be recognized as an
economic benefit in both cases. 25
20. Id. at 419. Procedurally, the Tax Court is bound, under Jack E. Golson, 54
T.C. 742 (1970) to follow a court of appeals decision which is squarely on point, where
the only appeal from the Tax Court is to that court of appeals. However, since the Tax
Court in Broderson was sitting in the Seventh Circuit, it was not bound to follow
Stevens. Thus it may be better to proceed in United States District Court where a term
policy is involved, unless the action is in the Second Circuit. See INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 7422.
21. 52 T.C. 89 (1969).
22. Members of the taxpayer's family were the policy beneficiaries.
23. Paul L. Frost, 52 T.C. 89, 96 (1969). (Emphasis added.)
24. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 61, 71.
25. The Frost court noted the broad scope given to Section 61 and cited as author-
ity Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956); Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.,
348 U.S. 426 (1955); Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945). In Smith the Su-
preme Court said of the comparable section of the 1939 Code: "[It] is broad enough
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If the insurance protection received by the wife is recognized as
an economic benefit,2" several changes in existing law would follow.
Both whole life and term policies confer insurance protection on the
wife; consequently, the type of policy utilized should be irrelevant."
Furthermore, the requirement that the wife actually own the policy"
should be discarded if the wife does, in fact, receive the policy's
protection." Similarly, the irrevocable beneficiary requirement ap-
pears unnecessary, provided the wife is clearly the policy beneficiary
for the duration of the alimony period. Although upon death, remar-
riage, or by the terms of the agreement the wife may cease to be the
policy beneficiary, cognizance should be taken of the protection ac-
tually received during the alimony years.
If life insurance premiums paid by the husband are treated as
alimony where the wife is neither the owner nor irrevocable benefici-
ary, then only that portion of the premium allocable to the cost of
insurance protection for the year should be considered alimony. 3'
Thus, that portion of the premium allocable to the cash surrender
to include in taxable income any economic or financial benefit conferred on the em-
ployee as compensation, whatever the form or mode by which it is effected." 324 U.S.
at 181.
26. See Note, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1966) (urging recognition of insurance
protection as an economic benefit).
27. All courts have not recognized the benefit of insurance protection in term
policies as is evidenced by the Broderson decision.
28. Stevens v. Commissioner, 439 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1971); Kiesling v. United
States, 349 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1965); Piel v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 887 (2d Cir. 1965);
Weil v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 612 (1954), aff'd, 240 F.2d 584 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 958 (1957); Turpin v. United States, 240 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Mo. 1965) (all
recognizing the requirement that ownership of the policy be vested in the wife). It
seems unfair to require a husband to divest himself irrevocably of a policy in which he
may have built up a great deal of cash value in order to obtain alimony treatment of
the premium payments. This is especially true where the husband, because of his age
or health, has become uninsurable from the standpoint of obtaining a new policy.
29. The Stevens court while indicating that insurance protection for a year is an
economic benefit, did not have to address the ownership requirement as the wife in
that case did own the policy. The court, by proper shaping of the decree, can insure
that the wife will receive the policy protection and thus its economic benefit without
ownership. For example, the decree could prevent the husband from borrowing on the
policy, surrendering it for cash, or allowing it to lapse so long as the alimony obligation
is outstanding. Additionally the husband may agree to pledge the policy to the wife
thereby making her a preferred creditor in the event of his demise. LA. CIv. CODE art.
3133.
30. The reference to "cost of insurance" means the portion of the premium used
to buy actual insurance and not the portion allocable to the policy reserve of a whole
life policy. Such portions allocable to the policy reserve represent excess premium
payments above the amount insuring against the actuarial probability of death.
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value in a whole life policy should not be taxed to her because she is
receiving no economic benefit from it."l Conversely, where the wife
owns a whole life policy and is the irrevocable beneficiary, the entire
premium should be considered alimony because she receives eco-
nomic benefit from the increase in cash surrender value as well as
from the insurance protection.
These changes would be in line with economic realities and pro-
perly balance all the interests. The husband would be able to realize
the tax benefit of the deduction;32 the wife would be assured of receiv-
ing her alimony; and the government would still receive revenue from
the inclusion of the premiums in the gross income of the wife.
Tax Treatment of the Proceeds
Upon the death of the husband and receipt of the proceeds by
the wife, the question arises as to the tax treatment of the proceeds.
Although this question has not been decided, under Section 101, 33
insurance proceeds are generally not includible in gross income. How-
ever, Section 101(e) denies this exclusion to "any payment as is inclu-
dible in the gross income of the wife under Section 71 (relating to
alimony) .... 3 Thus the question becomes whether such proceeds
are alimony. Since most proceeds will be taken in a lump sum, it
could be argued that the payment does not constitute alimony be-
cause it is not a periodic payment.
31
If the proceeds are, however, held to be alimony, the amount of
proceeds included in her gross income" should be reduced by that
amount representing premium payments made by her husband
which have been included in her gross income. Support for this posi-
tion is found in the "transfer for valuable consideration" rule of the
31. A suggested method of setting up the policy is to designate the wife as primary
beneficiary of the policy only to the extent of the remaining alimony obligation and to
allow the husband to designate whomever he chooses as primary beneficiary of the
remaining portion. Thus, regardless of the type policy used, only the amount of the
policy premium used to purchase the insurance amount payable to the wife for a given
year would be deemed alimony.
32. See note 28 supra. Adoption of these recommendations would allow the hus-
band who has become uninsurable to retain his existing policy and merely designate
the wife as beneficiary for the duration of the alimony period. If the husband is
insurable, he would have the option of purchasing a new policy or using an existing
policy with the wife as beneficiary.
33. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 101(a).
34. Id. § 101(e).
35. This situation is analagous to a lump sum settlement by a husband which
would not be deductible as alimony. See note 7 supra.
36. See notes 6-8, 33-35 and accompanying text supra.
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Internal Revenue Code. 7 That rule denies the normal exclusion of life
insurance proceeds from gross income where a policy is transferred.
It does allow a deduction to the extent of the consideration paid for
the policy and the premiums paid by the transferree. The policy in
question may not have been actually transferred, but the situations
are analogous,"8 and to the extent the wife is required to include the
premiums in her gross income, it seems she is giving consideration for
the policy."
Tax Planning Under Existing Law
The use of insurance policies is a valuable device in divorce or
separation agreements. Notwithstanding the judicial uncertainty
concerning such agreements, there are several means by which the
practitioner can achieve the intended results."'
If the husband is insurable at the time of the divorce, the most
certain method is for the wife to purchase a policy on his life4' and
pay the premiums herself42 with the cost of premiums being consid-
ered in determining the amount of the husband's alimony obligation.
An agreement structured in this manner would prove advantageous
to both parties. Payments to the wife should be deductible as a nor-
mal Section 71 alimony payment. The wife is assured of receiving her
alimony in one form or the other, and she should avoid being taxed
on the proceeds43 in the event of the husband's death.4 If an existing
37. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 101(a)(2).
38. Actual ownership should make no difference if she is receiving benefit from
the policy.
39. Such treatment would avoid placing a double taxation burden on the wife.
40. See notes 6-8 and accompanying text supra. The parties must, of course,
comply with all the requirements of Section 71.
41. See Wenig, Use of Life Insurance in Divorce and Separation Agreements,
N.Y.U. 28TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 837, 852 (1970).
42. The applicability of this proposal is subject to state insurance law regarding
insurable interests. LA. R.S. 22:613 (1950) provides that there is an insurable interest
in the cases of persons not related by blood or law (for example divorced spouses are
no longer related by law) and having a lawful and substantial interest in the life of
the insured.
43. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 101 (providing rules for exclusion and inclusion
of certain life insurance proceeds). See also notes 33-35 and accompanying text supra.
44. Cosman v. United States, 440 F.2d 1017 (Ct. Cl. 1971) requires a degree of
caution on the practitioner's part. There the taxpayer transferred a life insurance
policy to a trust incident to the separation agreement and divorce decree. The wife was
to pay the premiums with money received by her from the husband. The amount at
issue was the payment of the exact amount of the premium to the wife with which she
would pay the premium. The Court of Claims in denying the deduction of the husband
[Vol. 34
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policy is transferred, complete ownership should pass to her, and she
should be designated as irrevocable beneficiary. There should be no
contingencies upon her right other than naming the children as con-
tingent beneficiaries.",
George H. Robinson, Jr.
found that the former wife had received no economic benefit and that she "has been a
conduit through which the payment passed .... " However, the court also seemed
to have been greatly influenced by the very limited interests of the wife in the trust.
45. See Stevens v. Commissioner, 439 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1971); Rev. Rul. 218, 1970-
1 CuM. BULL. 19. An additional problem where a policy is transferred is that under
United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962), the husband must recognize gain upon the
transfer of the policy to the extent that its value exceeds its basis.
